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Abstract
This paper analyzes the channels through which financial crises exert long-term negative
effects on output. Recent models suggest that a shortfall in productivity-enhancing invest-
ments temporarily slows technological progress, creating a gap between pre-crisis trend
and actual GDP. This hypothesis is tested using a linked lender-borrower dataset on 519
U.S. corporations responsible for 54% of industrial research and development. Exploiting
quasi-experimental variation in firm-level exposure to the 2008-9 financial crisis, I show
that tight credit reduced investments in productivity-enhancement, and has significantly
slowed down output growth between 2010 and 2015. A partial-equilibrium aggregation
exercise suggests output would be 12% higher today if productivity-enhancing investments
had grown at pre-crisis rates.
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1. Introduction
A growing empirical literature shows that the effect of financial crises on output is not tran-
sitory. Crises are characterized by severe recessions during which a decline in output of 10 to
15% is not uncommon. In contrast to what standard macroeconomic models predict, these
losses are often not reversed. While growth rates recover to levels similar to the pre-crisis trend
within 2 to 3 years, there is no boom with above-average growth in which the level of output
is able to recuperate. As a result, there is a permanent gap between the economy’s original
projected path and actual output. (Boyd et al., 2005; Cerra and Saxena, 2008; Furceri and
Zdzienicka, 2012; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2014; Teulings and Zubanov, 2014). Recovery from
the recent global financial crisis and the ensuing “Great Recession” has followed a similar
pattern. In the United States, industrial production declined by 17% between 2007 and 2009,
while real GDP fell by 4.3%. This sharp reduction in activity was not followed by an episode
of high growth. To the contrary, average output growth between 2010 and 2016 was only 2.5%
per year, which is 0.3 percentage points lower than growth between 2002 and 2007. Conse-
quently, GDP has deviated by 15% from the level that an extrapolated trend between 2000
and 2007 predicts. This implies that annual per capita income would on average be $8000
higher today if no crisis had occurred. This experience is not unique to the United States.
Output fell below trend-levels after 2007 across developed economies, as Figure 1 illustrates.
In the United Kingdom, per capita GDP has deviated 20% from trend, while output in Ger-
many and France has fallen behind by 8 and 15%, respectively. Ball (2014) documents that
deviations in GDP were accompanied by an 8% reduction in OECD potential output. This
means that the aggregate loss of output in the aftermath of the crisis is roughly the size of
the economies of the United Kingdom, Austria, Denmark, and Ireland, combined.
Standard business cycle models, even with financial frictions, predict that the economy
always returns to steady state. Recessions and expansions are mere transitory deviations from
a long-term trend. Why does mean reversion not happen after financial crises? A small but
growing theoretical literature suggests that a shortfall in productivity-enhancing investment
is the answer. Investments in, for instance, research and development (R&D) and intangible
capital are particularly affected by financial crises as they are risky, pay off with substantial
delays, and have poor collateral value (e.g. Hall and Lerner, 2010). Endogenous growth
models predict that a temporary reduction in such investments slows the rate of technological
progress to levels below the balanced growth path, which has a persistent effect on potential
GDP. When the crisis fades and investments recover, technological progress regains its original
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Figure 1. Real Gross Domestic Product vs Trend, 2000-2015
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Solid and dashed lines present actual and trend (log) GDP, respectively. Series are standardized such that
2000Q1 has value 1. Trends extrapolate output growth between 2000 and 2007. Source: Author’s calculations
using OECD national accounts data.
growth rate. GDP does not catch-up to losses during the crisis, and is on a permanently lower
trajectory. While intuitive, there is no causal evidence on the validity of this explanation.1
The 2008-9 financial crisis presents a unique opportunity to fill that void. By comparing
firms that exogenously faced different degrees of exposure to the economy-wide tightening of
credit, I assess whether reductions in productivity-enhancing investments at firm-level explain
why growth in the aftermath of the crisis has been sluggish. This hypothesis is tested using
a linked lender-borrower micro dataset on 519 medium- to large-sized firms in the United
States. These firms are responsible for 54% of industrial R&D with total sales measuring 28%
of 2007 GDP. Following Chodorow-Reich (2014), I exploit the long-term nature of relationships
between firms and banks to obtain exogenous variation in the extent to which firms are exposed
to credit tightening around the financial crisis. Firms that rely on loans from banks that held
high credit-risk assets in 2007, underestimated the credit-risk of their portfolio, were strongly
affected by the Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy, the subsequent collapse of interbank markets
or had higher leverage are expected to face greater difficulty financing productivity-enhancing
investments during the crisis. Similarly, firms with a large fraction of their long-term debt
due for refinancing during the crisis are exogenously limited in their ability to engage in new
projects. I then use measures of crisis-exposure as instruments for productivity-enhancing
investments, to assess their effect on firm-level output growth between 2010 and 2014.
1Descriptive evidence exists for the recovery from the 2008-9 financial crisis, in papers that analyze de-
velopments of total factor productivity (TFP) during the Great Recession: e.g., Hall (2014), Christiano et al.
(2015), Ollivaud and Turner (2015) and Reifschneider et al. (2015). Alternatively, Fernald (2014) warns that
comparing pre- and post-crisis trends in TFP may result in an overestimation of the decline in TFP due to
excess growth before 2007. He also notes that the decline in TFP growth pre-dates the Great Recession.
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By focusing on the 2008-9 financial crisis in the U.S., I exploit three favorable charac-
teristics of this episode. First, recovery from the financial crisis exhibits the typical gap
between the original trend path and actual GDP, as shown in Figure 1. Second, the 2008-9
financial crisis is the largest financial crisis since the crash of 1929 and the Great Depres-
sion of the 1930’s. The magnitude of the crisis is important, as identification requires that
exposed firms are unable to compensate short-term credit disruptions with internal funds to
finance productivity-enhancing investments. The strong decline in credit availability after the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, which is used as the crisis’ starting point,
suggests that the disruption was sufficiently large. In the months after September, supply of
new loans to corporations fell by 47%, while supply fell by 79% compared to the pre-crisis
peak (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). Third, the 2008-9 financial crisis provides a source
of quasi-experimental variation in the extent to which individual firms were affected. As the
crisis did not originate in the market for commercial loans, exogenous variation in the impact
of the financial crisis on firms can be derived through comparing the banks from which they
usually obtain funds.2 The suddenness of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September of
2008 furthermore allows a firm’s long-term debt maturity at the onset of the crisis to be used
as a second source of exogenous variation.
I find evidence of a significantly positive relationship between exposure to the 2008-9
financial crisis and reductions in productivity-enhancing investments. Using a novel measure
of asset quality based on the distribution of bank assets across Basel I risk categories, I find
that firms relying on banks with low-quality assets in 2007 reduce investments during the crisis
by 8 percentage points per standard deviation decline in quality. Similar results are found
for the decline in a bank’s asset quality between 2007 and 2010, which captures the extent
to which banks underestimated risks. This relationship also appears when using established
proxies for bank-exposure to the 2008-9 financial crisis such as 2007 leverage and deposits or
exposure to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, although results are stronger with the new
measure. Difference-in-difference regressions show that the negative effect of exposure to the
crisis first appears in 2008, and persists for the remainder of the sample. In the main analysis,
I find that firms whose investments in productivity-enhancement decline during the crisis
experience lower output growth between 2010 and 2014. For each percentage point decline
in investment, output growth drops by roughly 0.4 percentage points. Results are robust to
the inclusion of control variables for firm age, size, pre-crisis growth and impact of the 2008
recession, as well as detailed sector and state fixed effects. The estimates are highly significant
in all specifications and are of an economically relevant magnitude: a partial equilibrium
aggregation exercise suggests that output amongst sampled firms would be 12% higher in
2014 if productivity-enhancing investments had grown along pre-crisis trends. Investments
in capital, while negatively related to crisis-exposure, cannot explain growth in the medium
2For an elaborate discussion, see Gorton (2008) and Chodorow-Reich (2014).
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term. Placebo tests and an assessment of the timing of the effect are used to show that the
estimates are likely to be causal.
This paper’s primary contribution is the provision of causal evidence on the premise that
reduced credit supply during financial crises affects productivity-enhancement and subsequent
growth. That is of particular importance to a growing theoretical literature that aims to
explain the long-term effects of financial crises on output in microfounded models. These
models are usually built around endogenous growth theory. Following the tradition sparked
by Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992), and Grossman and Helpman (1993), long-
term growth is driven by technological progress which is the outcome of profit-maximizing
investment in innovation. A number of papers hypothesize that financial crises reduce such
investments as innovative projects are risky, pay off with lags and are bad-collateral, such
that banks are unwilling or unable to provide the needed funds. In Aghion et al. (2010), for
instance, short run liquidity shocks move firms away from long-term productivity-enhancing
investments in favour of short run production capital if credit constraints are tight.3 Garcia-
Macia (2015) claims that firms are unable to fund investment in intangible assets during
financial crises, as their collateral value is hard to collect. Similarly, the models in Ates and
Saffie (2013) and (2014) claim that financial turmoil affects technological progress through
the ability of banks to observe project quality under imperfect information. In Queralto´
(2013), financial crises increase the costs of financial intermediation through balance sheet
deterioration a´ la Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), which reduces the entrance of entrepreneurs
that need to fund entry costs. Schmitz (2014) adds that the effect of crises on innovation is
amplified by the fact that small and young firms are particularly affected by credit tightness, as
these produce more radical innovation.4 A related literature explains the long-term effects of
financial crises through non-financial channels. Crises reduce the profitability of productivity-
enhancing investments because demand and prices are low. Examples include Fatas (2000),
Comin and Gertler (2006), Benigno and Fornaro (2015) and Anzoategui et al. (2016).5 In these
models, financial crises are effectively large recessions. Results in this paper provide support
in favor of models in which financial crises are distinct from large recessions, as restricted loan
supply is the source of declined investment in productivity-enhancement and medium-term
growth. Reductions in the profitability of investments could form a complementary channel.
This paper’s second contribution is the conclusion that productivity-enhancing investments
are affected by disruptions to bank lending. Existing evidence on the importance of bank loans
for investments in R&D and intangible assets is mixed. Hall and Lerner (2010) argue that
firms vastly prefer to finance such investments internally using cash flow or equity because
intangible capital has poor collateral and because it is difficult for lenders to estimate the
3Empirical support for this channel based on French micro data is provided in Aghion et al. (2012).
4This is somewhat at odds with Garcia-Macia et al. (2015), who find that incumbent firms are more
important for innovation than entrants in the U.S.
5Economic activity is also related to endogenous growth in Bianchi and Kung (2014).
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quality of projects, which raises the cost of loans. In line with this, Brown et al. (2009) find that
young firms tend to finance R&D expenditures almost entirely without debt. Alternatively,
Nanda and Nicholas (2014) show that innovative firms in the Great Depression that operated
in the same county as banks which suspended depositor payments produced fewer patents
in following years. Patents at affected firms were also less frequently cited, less general and
less original, as derived from patent citations. For the 2008-9 financial crisis, Kipar (2011)
shows that German firms were more likely to cancel innovative projects if firms borrowed from
credit unions rather than commercial banks. Garicano and Steinwender (2013) use Spanish
data to show that crises change the composition of investments towards short-term instead of
long-term capital. An emerging literature, surveyed by Nanda and Kerr (2015), furthermore
finds that bank deregulation during the 1980s benefited innovation.6
The empirical strategy builds on a number of papers that use firm-exposure to lending
shocks to assess the real effects of financial crises. Firm-level data is well suited to analyze this
paper’s question because firms differ exogenously in the extent to which they are exposed to the
financial crisis, facilitating causal interpretation of results. This is one of the main reasons that
micro data has become increasingly popular in macroeconomic work. Particularly relevant
examples include Chodorow-Reich (2014), Acharya et al. (2015), Bentolila et al. (2015) and
Giroud and Mueller (2015), who analyse the employment effects of credit shocks by considering
variation in firm-level crisis-exposure. Franklin et al. (2015) conduct a similar exercise for the
United Kingdom, and add that credit thightning negatively affected labor productivity in
2008-9. It is similarly related to Almeida et al. (2012), Greenstone et al. (2014), Adelino et al.
(2015), Aghion et al. (2015), and Paravisini et al. (2015). These papers use exposure to credit
shocks to analyse the effect on employment, investments, exports and short-term output. To
my knowledge, this is the first paper to apply that methodology to study the effect of credit
shocks on productivity-enhancing investments and subsequent growth over the medium run.
This paper is also related to papers on slow episodes of slow recovery from recessions.
Shimer (2012) develops a model with rigid wages and show that shocks to capital stocks
have persistent effects on the level of output. Gal´ı et al. (2012) show that recovery from
recessions in the U.S. has been slow after the 1990s, and suggest that an increase in risk
premiums in the recessions’ wake is likely responsible. Others have used financial frictions as
a source of persistently low output in the aftermath of shocks (e.g. Hall, 2010; Gertler and
Kiyotaki, 2010). These models predict that GDP will eventually recovery to its original trend.
This paper does not address the empirical question whether the effect of financial crises is
permanent or fades over long horizons, as such an analysis requires decades of data.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the empirical
strategy and introduces the linked lender-borrower dataset, while Section 3 provides mea-
6This paper is also related to a long literature on the effect of innovation and R&D on output growth. An
elaborate discussion of past work and empirical strategies is provided in Cohen (2010).
5
sures of exposure to the 2008-9 financial crisis. Results are presented in Section 4, while an
aggregation exercise is discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. Empirical Methodology
This section explains the empirical strategy used to test whether investment in productivity by
firms can explain the long-term effects of financial crises on output. The identification problem
and estimation equations are outlined in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 introduces the dataset and
measures of investments and output growth, while summary statistics and a discussion of
sample representativeness are provided in 2.3.
2.1. Identifcation Strategy
A firm’s decision to invest in productivity-enhancement depends on the profits which it expects
to gain from investing, which are directly affected by exposure to the 2008-9 financial crisis.
Reductions in the supply of new bank loans raise interest rate costs, especially for investments
in assets that are poor collateral (Garcia-Macia, 2015). Credit rationing may even prevent
firms from obtaining adequate funds at all. While credit tightens throughout the economy
during a crisis, firms differ in the extent to which their access is impeded. As shown by
Chodorow-Reich (2014), there is a strong relationship between the supply of loans to firms
and health of the banks from which they obtained their loans prior to the 2008-9 financial
crisis. Similarly, Almeida et al. (2012) show that firms which had a smaller percentage of their
long-term debt due during the crisis were more able to sustain capital investments.
These firm-level differences are expected to determine the change in productivity-enhancing
investments during the 2008-9 financial crisis. If differences can be captured in exogenous
variables, they enable an instrumental variable analysis on the effect of such investments on
output growth in subsequent years. Instruments are needed because a simple regression of
output growth on productivity-enhancing investments is impeded by endogeneity. Firms that
expect output to grow irrespective of the crisis have an incentive to invest in, for instance,
the efficiency of production processes or to expand their line of products. Alternatively, firms
that foresee declining sales might invest in the development of new goods and services in an
attempt to regain growth. These channels create a positive or negative correlation between
productivity-enhancing investments and output growth irrespective of whether firms were af-
fected by the crisis. An instrumental variable strategy will yield unbiased estimates of the
coefficients if the instruments satisfy the exogeneity condition: they may not affect a firm’s
ability or desire to undertake productivity-enhancing investments other than through its abil-
ity to obtain loans under acceptable conditions. If this condition holds, the following equation
describes the first stage:
Investi = α+ βExposurei + i,k (1)
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where Invest denotes the ratio of average productivity-enhancing investments after the Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy over average investments during pre-crisis base years for firm i. This
metric corrects for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity that determines the amount that
firms invest in productivity. It also corrects for the fact that not all firms require equal expen-
diture to increase productivity. Exposure is a set of measures that determine to what extent
firms are exposed to credit tightening during the 2008-9 financial crisis. To verify that Invest
is unaffected by Exposure before 2008, (1) is also estimated in difference-in-difference form.
The second stage of the estimation measures the effect of developments in investments
on medium-term output growth. At the macro-level, endogenous growth models suggest that
investments in productivity affect steady state output through total factor productivity. Firm-
level total factor productivity and potential output cannot be measured accurately, because
production functions differ across firms and factor utilization is not observable. Growth in
actual output is used instead, measured through real sales. Sales are a common measure
in work that studies determinants of firm growth.7 As a robustness check I also analyse
the effect of productivity-enhancing investments on labor productivity, which yields similar
results. Actual output is a good approximation for developments in potential output when the
economy is in steady state, but might be far off if the economy experiences a recession. The
2008-9 financial crisis was joined by the largest decline in economic activity since the Great
Depression of the 1930s. This is problematic, because the initial recession might obscure
the correlation between productivity-enhancing investments and medium-term growth. To
correct for this, I analyze developments in growth once firms have, on average, recovered from
the demand shock. This is defined as the point where their sales are equal to the peak level
prior to the crisis. If firms were producing at their potential rate, further growth has to come
from growth in potential output, which is more likely to be driven by productivity-enhancing
investments.8 The second stage estimation equation reads:
∆Outputi = α+ γ̂Investi + µ′Xi,k,s + φk + ψs + ηi (2)
where ∆Output denotes the growth rate of medium-term output after the average firm has
recovered for firm i in industry k with headquarters in state s. ̂Investi denotes the fitted values
from first-stage equation (1), X is a vector of firm-level control variables while φ and ψ are
industry and state fixed effects, respectively. A significantly positive estimate of γ is consistent
with the hypothesis. Causal inference requires that productivity-enhancing investments are
the only channel through which exposure affects medium-term growth. Falsification tests
using other types of investments are provided to assess whether this exclusion restriction is
satisfied. To assess the timing of the effect of investments, a projection along equation (2) is
estimated for annual developments in output.
7Examples include Gabaix (2011), Bloom et al. (2013), and Kogan et al. (2016).
8A detailed motivation is provided in Section 2.2.2.
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2.2. Dataset and Variable Construction
Data on firm variables for investments, output growth and covariates are taken from S&P’s
Compustat. Compustat contains balance sheet and income statement data for all publicly
listed firms in the U.S. It is the largest public firm-level micro dataset for the United States
and the only dataset containing R&D investments. The latter implies that larger datasets
which include private firms, such as the Longitudinal Business Database, are not suitable. I
start from the annual file and keep firms that engaged in R&D at least once in the three years
prior to the crisis. I drop observations with missing or negative total assets and sales, as well
as firms that leave or enter the dataset between 2002 and 2014.9 Firms that first appear in
the data after 2001 are excluded to allow sufficient years to calculate a pre-crisis growth trend
and to exclude very young firms. Firms in finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE), as well
as firms in government and regulated utility sectors are excluded. All variables are deflated
to 2009 USD using the BAE’s GDP deflator and are winsorized at bottom and top 3% tails.
The resulting dataset is merged with a 2015 extract of Thomson Reuters’ DealScan.
DealScan contains loan-level information on the characteristics of large commercial loans,
including the amount, conditions, collateral requirements, the purpose of loans, and most
importantly: the name of borrowers and lenders. Reuters obtains this information primarily
from SEC filings, complemented by sources such as news reports and from contacts inside
borrowing and lending institutions.10 Loans in DealScan account for over 75% of commer-
cial loans in the U.S., making it the most complete overview of debt transactions available
and the primary source of bank loan data for research.11 To select the sample of loans from
DealScan, I roughly follow the criteria in Sufi (2007), Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) and
Chodorow-Reich (2014). Loans with start dates prior to 1995 are not included as DealScan’s
coverage increased substantially from that year onwards. Loans with extraordinary purposes,
such as management buyouts, are also excluded.12 Following Chodorow-Reich (2014), I also
require that at least one of the lenders without for each loan is part of the top 43 of overall
lenders and drop lenders without any loans two years prior to the crisis, to allow balanced
matching with bank data later on. Finally, 260 loans with values below $10.000 are excluded.
The samples are merged using a linking table by Chava and Roberts (2008). The merged
Compustat-DealScan sample of R&D performers contains 519 firms whose total sales equal
28% of GDP and are responsible for 54% of corporate R&D in 2007.
92014 is the final year because a number of firms did not have data for 2015 at the time of writing.
10Information obtained from non-official sources is verified at the relevant firm before inclusion in the dataset.
11Carey and Hrycray (1999) find that between 50 to 75% of the volume of commercial loans is included in
the dataset, and a large majority of large loans. Chava and Roberts (2008) suggest that coverage has been even
higher from the late 1990s onwards. Examples of studies using DealScan data include Dennis and Mullineaux
(2000), Sufi (2007), Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), De Haas and Van Horen (2012). Chava and Roberts
(2008) and in particular Chodorow-Reich (2014) link DealScan to firm-level data in similar ways to mine.
12Specifically, loans for general corporate purchases, asset acquisitions, aircraft finance, credit enhancement,
debt refinancing, project, hardware and software financing, equipment purchases, real estate financing, ship
finance, telecoms build outs, trade finance and working capital are included.
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2.2.1. Measures for Productivity-Enhancing Investments
For these firms I create two variables to measure investment in productivity-enhancement. The
first is total R&D expenditures (Compustat item xrd). These include all the costs incurred
for the development of new products and services, including software costs. They also include
R&D activities undertaken by others for which the firm paid. This is particularly important
as firms increasingly rely on external sources for R&D (e.g. Arora et al. 2016 and Chesbrough
et al. 2006). The second measure also includes advertisement and marketing expenditures
(Compustat item xad). This variable is referred to as intangible capital investments.13 Ideally,
a measure of investment in productivity would also contain efforts to increase production
efficiency like employee training. Data on such expenses is unfortunately not available. Past
literature suggests however that these are likely correlated with other intangible investments
as their gains interact (see e.g. Michie and Sheehan 1999, Thornhill 2006). My measures are
therefore proxies for changes in the total effort of firms to become more productive. Invest
is calculated by taking the ratio of average annual investments in productivity in 2009 and
2010 to average annual investments in the three years prior to the crisis. 2009 and 2010
are used to measure investments during the crisis because most firms reduced investments
in those years compared to their peak in 2008. Using the ratio with investments three years
prior the crisis makes the measure is robust to volatile year-to-year differences in expenditure,
keeps firms without expenditures in specific years in the sample, and corrects for unobserved
heterogeneity.14
2.2.2. Measures for Medium-Term Growth
To measure ∆Output I use the percentage increase in real sales between 2010 and 2014.
Growth between these years is likely to capture the effect of the crisis over the medium
horizon, for three reasons. Firstly, the vast majority of firms experienced their trough in
output before the end of 2010. To show this, the left graph of Figure 2 plots the distribution
of turning points over time. Turning points are defined as quarters in which the direction of a
firm’s output growth changes from expansionary to recessionary (at the peak) and vice versa
(at the trough). Turning points are obtained for each firm using a simple dating algorithm.15
The figure shows that output amongst most firms peaked between the second and fourth
quarter of 2008. Over half the sampled firms reach their trough in 2009, while by the end
13Chen (2014) use sales, general and administrative investments to measure intangible investments. This is
problematic when assessing the drivers of sales growth, as components of these expenses are variable costs.
14Sensitivity checks on definitions of Invest in Section 4 show that results are robust to using different years.
15The algorithm works as follows. First, quarterly sales for each firm are obtained from the Compustat
quarterly file. These series are seasonally adjusted using the X-11 procedure. Second, short term volatility
is smoothed by taking a three-month centred moving average of the output series. Third, local minima and
maxima are identified using a script by Philippe Bracke that implements methods from Harding and Pagan
(2002). Their method imposes restrictions on the number of quarters between turning points. In my calibration,
each turning point must be at least 2 quarters long, while a complete cycle (from through to through or from
peak to peak) must be at least 6 quarters long.
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Figure 2. Firm-Level Output Turning Points and Growth, 2002-2014
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Note: Left figure presents the number of firms reaching the peak (dark, upper half) and trough (light, lower half) of
output cycles in a given quarter. Calculated using turning point dating algorithms described in text. Right figure:
average real output standardized to 1 for the third quarter of 2008. Vertical line marks the quarter of Lehman
Brother’s bankruptcy.
of 2010 most firms have regained growth. Growth after 2010 is therefore likely to capture
crisis-recovery rather than the crisis-impact. Secondly, 2010 is the year in which firm-output
had, on average, recovered to pre-crisis levels. The right graph in Figure 2 plots an index
of mean output within the sample, which exceeds its pre-crisis peak in the first quarter of
2011. Growth beyond that level is more likely to reflect increases in potential output due to
productivity-enhancing investments, as demand shocks from the crisis have worn off. Thirdly,
investments in R&D start paying off after at least 2 or 3 years (Mansfield et al., 1971). Because
investments first declined in 2009, the first year in which a treatment effect is expected is 2011.
Patents are not used as outcomes because available data ends in 2010 (Kogan et al., 2016).
2.3. Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics for the resulting dataset are provided in Table 1. The upper panel sum-
marizes firm characteristics prior to the financial crisis, in 2007. The median firm employs
over 5000 employees, holds $230 million in capital and sold over $1.3 billion in 2007. This
implies that sampled firms are much larger than average U.S. corporations. Return on assets
and sales, measured as the ratio of net income and real total assets and sales, lie around 5%.
Yearly output growth, measured as percentage change of real sales, was highest prior to 2008
when the median firm grew more than 7% per year. The bottom panel of Table 1 summarizes
the main variables of interest: investment growth in R&D and intangible capital. Note that
median growth of both variables is slightly positive despite the decline in investments during
the crisis. This is driven by a large increase in investments between 2005 and 2008.16
16In 2009, for instance, median R&D investments were 7% lower than in 2008 while intangible investments
declined by 8%.
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Figure 3. Sample and Aggregate Investment in R&D and Intangible Assets, 2002-2014
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Note: Solid and dashed lines present productivity-enhancing investments in the sample and at the aggregate level,
respectively. Aggregate investments use OECD business and enterprise broad R&D expenditures. Correlation between
aggregate investments and R&D (left figure) is 0.87 and 0.83 for intangible investments (right figure).
Although companies in the sample are much larger than average American firms, their
productivity-enhancing investments are highly correlated with national values. Figure 3 shows
that indices of both investments in R&D and investments in intangible capital co-move closely
with the OECD index of U.S. enterprise R&D. The associated correlation coefficients are 0.87
and 0.83, respectively. This is expected as sampled firms are responsible for 54% of aggregate
industrial R&D in 2007. Consequently, even though firms in the sample are not a random
sample of the universe of American firms, they form a significant population on their own.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Firm Characteristics
Variable Median Mean St. Dev. 10th Pct. 90th Pct. Obs. Notes
Characteristics, 2007
Capital 231.88 1234.61 2522.76 9.81 3653.71 519 Mil. ’09 USD
Sales 1360.09 5379.26 10275.32 94.21 14702.00 519 Mil. ’09 USD
Employment 5.14 15.83 26.89 .32 46.00 519 Thousands
Return on Assets 5.48 4.14 9.10 -5.42 13.19 519 Percentage
Return on Sales 5.65 4.30 10.32 -6.90 15.20 519 Percentage
Annual Sales Growth
Average 2003-2007 7.18 10.70 13.42 -3.31 25.16 518 Percentage
Average 2008-2009 -11.77 -11.76 16.07 -32.93 7.52 518 Percentage
Average 2010-2014 3.23 4.06 8.67 -9.10 14.34 519 Percentage
Investment Growth Crisis
R&D Investment 3.96 14.11 64.13 -46.34 77.18 519 Percentage
Intangible Investment 3.01 13.46 53.52 -41.40 79.46 519 Percentage
Descriptive statistics for the merged Compustat-DealScan sample. Includes all non-FIRE firms continuously present
in the dataset from 2003 to 2014 that had positive R&D expenditures in at least one year between 2004 and 2007.
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3. Measuring Exposure to Crisis
Firms face greater exposure to the 2008-9 financial crisis if they suffered an above-average
restriction in credit supply. The extent to which firms have access to credit cannot be inferred
from the amount of loans they take out or the interest rate charged, because these variables
are also determined by firms’ solvability and demand for loans. Instead, I rely on indirect
measures of firm-level exposure to the crisis. I first summarize these measures in Section 3.1.
Data sources are discussed in Section 3.2 while descriptive statistics are provided in 3.3.
3.1. Measures
To measure Exposure in first-stage equation (1), variables are composed that quantify exoge-
nous exposure to credit tightening. Exogeneity requires that these do not affect a firm’s ability
or desire to undertake productivity-enhancing investment, other than through its ability to
obtain loans under acceptable conditions. Measures are grouped into two categories: bank
relationships and debt structure.
3.1.1. Measures using Relationship Banking
The main measures use the health of banks from which firms usually borrowed prior to
the crisis to measure exposure. Firms tend to borrow from a limited number of financial
institutions because of the benefits to relationship banking. By repeating interaction with
borrowers, banks are able to monitor and screen loans more closely, which helps to solve
problems of asymmetric information.17 Measures of exposure that use bank health explicitly
rely on relationship banking, as firms should not be able to perfectly substitute loans from
affected banks with loans from alternative, unaffected banks. Chodorow-Reich (2014), on
which this part of the empirical strategy is based, shows that the health of banks from which
firms obtained loans was an important determinant of firm-level employment growth between
2008 and 2009. This is in line with the importance of relationships in bank-loan provision.
The relationship between each firm and bank in the sample is derived from the share that
bank h contributed to the last loan taken out by firm i in the DealScan sample prior to June
2007. This share is usually smaller than one because the majority of loans in DealScan (73%)
is syndicated.18 Such loans are the primary source of bank loans for U.S. corporations.19 In
contrast to standard loans, syndicated loans are provided by a group (the syndicate) rather
than an individual lender. The choice to divide loans amongst participants is usually driven by
the desire to diversify on the side of banks, as syndicated loans can be very large. They take the
17A review of theory and evidence is provided in Boot (2000).
18Loans after June 2007 are not considered because turmoil on financial markets commenced around the
summer of 2007 BNP Paribas blocked withdrawals from three hedge funds engaged in asset-backed security
investment in early August.
19This explanation draws on Sufi (2007).
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form of fixed term loans, bridge loans, credit lines, leases, or most other conventional forms.
Firms seeking a syndicated loan arrange the basic terms with a lead arranger, also known
as the underwriting bank. Once the loan amount, interest rate and additional requirements
like collateral and fees have been agreed upon, the lead arranger recruits other investors to
participate in the loan.
The primary measure of bank-level exposure to the financial crisis captures the soundness
of bank assets, in a novel way. I use the distribution of assets across risk weighing categories for
Basel 1 capital requirements. Under the original Basel Accord, banks were to classify assets in
5 categories along credit risk. Assets such as cash and U.S. treasury notes carry risk weights
of 0%. Securities with excellent ratings, including AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities,
carry a weight of 20%. Residential mortgages fall under the 50% risk category, provided that
they are fully first lien and accruing on schedule. Commercial loans and most non-performing
assets fall under the 100% risk category.20 Risk-weighted assets are calculated by multiplying
the dollar amount of assets in each category with the weight-percentage. Because higher
percentages imply greater credit risk, these categories measure the soundness of the bank’s
asset portfolio. Specifically, banks with high risk-weighted assets compared to total assets
hold lower quality assets than firms with less risk-weighted assets. To measure the overall
soundness of assets, I therefore calculate:
Asset Quality = Assets/Risk-Weighted Assets (3)
for each bank. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to use this measure for firm-exposure
to the financial crisis. Banks with low-quality assets in 2007 are expected to face greater
difficulty satisfying capital requirements during the financial crisis, and hence to decrease
supply of loans.21 A second measure of bank balance sheet health is the percentage change
in Asset Quality between 2007 and 2009.22 Because assets need to be reclassified to higher
risk categories when not performing, exposure to failing mortgages or asset-backed securities
leads to an increase in risk-weighted assets and a decline in asset quality.23
Alternative measures of bank-exposure to the crisis capture the extent to which banks
were affected by the credit-supply shock and the collapse of interbank markets. Most of these
measures are taken from past work. The first measure quantifies a bank’s relationship with
Lehman Brothers, following Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010). This variable is calculated as
the fraction of the total amount of syndicated loans that Lehman Brothers played a lead
role in. Banks with high exposure to Lehman provided less new loans during the 2008-9
20Full reporting requirements for U.S. banks are available via this link.
21In line with this premise, Das and Sy (2012) find that firms with higher risk-weighted assets experienced
greater declines in stock prices during the 2008-9 financial crisis.
22The main results are similar if using change between 2008 and 2009 or 2008 and 2010.
23To alleviate endogeneity concerns, I asses the effect of new loans to firm i during the crisis on change
in asset quality: these are subtracted from total and risk-weighted assets assuming the highest risk weight.
Correlation with the original measure exceeds 0.99.
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financial crisis.24 The second measure quantifies a bank’s exposure to the collapse of asset-
backed securities (ABS), for which data is taken from Chodorow-Reich (2014). He derives
ABS exposure from the correlation between a firm’s daily stock returns with an index that
tracks the price of ABS securities issued in 2005 with, at the time, a AAA-rating.25 This is
preferred over the use of balance-sheet derived measures of ABS-exposure, as foreign banks
do not report such items consistently. The third measure is the ratio of deposits over assets.
Deposits capture the stability of bank funding, because it is less volatile than, for instance,
short term loans on interbank markets which eroded during the crisis (e.g. Brunnermeier
2009). In line with this, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show that banks with higher levels of
deposits reduced lending supply less than banks with other funding sources. The final measure
of credit-shock exposure is a dummy equal to 1 if the financial institution ceased to exist in its
current form during the crisis. To identify these banks, the sample is first restricted to banks
that stop reporting financial data between 2007 and 2010. These banks are hand-classified as
failed if they filed for bankruptcy during the crisis or if they merged to a healthier institution
under, for instance, regulatory pressure. The most important bank in the first category is
Lehman Brothers, while Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual are examples of the second.
To measure the health of bank balance sheets in 2007, two standard measures are used. The
first is the ratio of bad loan provisions over total loans, which is a proxy for the quality of
the bank’s loan portfolio. The second is leverage, defined as the ratio of liabilities over equity.
Higher leverage is associated with higher risk, as small changes in asset values can swiftly
turn equity negative.
The measures for crisis-exposure and balance sheet health above are calculated at the
level of financial institutions. To translate measures into firm-level variables, their weighted
average over the share of banks in the firm’s last pre-crisis loan syndicate is taken:
Exposurei =
H∑
h=1
ψi,h (Exposureh) (4)
where Exposureh represents each of the bank-level exposure variables, while ψi,h denotes the
share of bank h in firm i ’s final loan.26
3.1.2. Measures using Debt Structure
The final measure of firm-exposure to the 2008-9 financial crisis explores quasi-experimental
variation in a firm’s debt structure. Specifically, it measures the percentage of long-term debt
24Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) argues that this resulted from the decision by firms that borrowed from a
syndicate with Lehman to increase their usage of existing credit lines from other banks in the syndicate after
Lehman’s failure, to prevent having inadequate liquidity. A similar measure has also been used by De Haas
and Van Horen (2012), Chodorow-Reich (2014), and Acharya et al. (2015).
25He notes that the use of alternative ABS indices yield similar results.
26If multiple loans were taken at the same date, shares are calculated over all loans. Because ψ is only
available for a minority of loans in DealScan, it is imputed using the structure of syndicates. Following
Chodorow-Reich (2014), shares of lead-arrangers and participants are based on average shares of both types in
loans with the same number of leads and participants for which shares are available.
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due in the peak year of the financial crisis: 2008. Firms with a large fraction of their long-term
debt due in middle of the credit crisis faced lower availability and higher costs of capital such
that their ability to invest in productivity enhancement was hindered. As decisions on long-
term debt payable right at the crisis’ onset were made well before signs of the financial crisis
appeared, firms with high amounts due face exogenously greater exposure to the financial
crisis than others. A similar measure was first used by Almeida et al. (2012), who show that
firms with large portions of debt due were not significantly different from other firms prior to
the crisis in a number of dimensions, but displayed different investing behavior afterwards.
3.2. Data
The Compustat-DealScan dataset of R&D performers is merged with bank balance sheet
variables using Bureau Van Dijk’s Bankscope and Federal Reserve FR Y-9C tables. Bankscope
is used for data on international banks and investment banks, while Y-9C data is used for
American depository institutions. The datasets are merged using a script kindly provided by
Gabriel Chodorow-Reich. His file creates links for 258 banks which are responsible for the
creation of 85% of loans in the year prior to the crisis. Amongst the remainder, I hand-match
90 large lenders to Bankscope and Federal Reserve identifiers.27 Combined, matched banks
are responsible for issuing over 93% of DealScan loans. For Y-9C data, deposits are calculated
as the sum of total demand deposits (item 2210), total non-transaction saving deposits (item
2389) and total time deposits (the sum of items 2604 and 6648). For Bankscope data, the
sum of consumer and bank deposits (items 2031 and 2185) are used. Asset quality is only
calculated using Y-9C data because Bankscope’s risk weighted assets use Basel II internal
weights, which differ from Basel I’s.28
3.3. Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 2. The upper panel provides standard summary
statistics while to bottom panel provides a correlation matrix. All variables are winsorized at
the bottom and top 3% tails. A number of results stand out. First, it seems that banks which
were involved in many syndicated loans with Lehman Brothers were more heavily exposed to
mortgage backed securities, held lower-quality assets and had higher leverage ratio’s. Firms
with higher bad loan provisions were also more than averagely affected by mortgage-backed
securities and Lehman Brothers, although they are less likely to fail during the crisis. The
latter suggests that such provisions are also a measure of bank prudence. There is no strong
27The main results are similar when only using identifiers from Chodorow-Reich, while F-statistics are larger
when including additional banks.
28A dummy is added to the instruments for firms that only rely on loans from banks with no Y-9C data
available, which applies to 17 firms. The main results are similar if asset quality is calculated for Bankscope
banks using Basel II risk weights, although the results are less significant in some specifications. Results are
available upon request.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics Firm Exposure to 2008-2009 Financial Crisis
Summary Statistics Median Mean St. Dev. 10th Perc. 90th Perc. Obs. Notes
Bank’s Asset Quality
Asset Quality 6.40 6.88 3.34 4.22 12.54 519 See Text
∆ Asset Quality -32.90 -41.73 24.86 -76.73 -27.56 519 Percentage
Bank’s Crisis Exposure
Lehman Lead Share 2.15 2.11 0.91 0.13 2.68 519 Percentage
Abx Exposure 1.08 1.04 0.24 0.28 0.24 519 Stock Loading
Deposit Ratio 45.91 45.28 13.03 30.18 68.15 519 Perc. of Assets
Bankruptcy Dummy 0.00 4.72 1.30 0.00 14.70 519 Percentage
Bank’s Balance Sheet
Bad Loan Prov. 0.90 0.86 0.37 0.41 1.26 519 Perc. of Loans
Leverage Ratio 12.50 13.96 7.51 8.54 25.57 519 Debt-to-equity
Firm’s Characteristics
Debt due after 2008 3.89 12.64 21.76 0.00 33.56 456 % of LT Debt
Correlation Matrix Asset Q. ∆ A. Q. Lehman Abx Deposits Bankr. BLP Lev.
Bank’s Asset Quality
Asset Quality 1
∆ Asset Quality 0.61* 1
Bank’s Crisis Exposure
Lehman Lead -0.43* -0.13* 1
Abx Exposure -0.43* 0.08 0.60* 1
Deposit Ratio 0.63* 0.21* -0.47* -0.42* 1
Bankrupt -0.21* -0.26* 0.01 0.17* 0.15* 1
Bank’s Balance Sheet
Bad Loan Prov. -0.10* 0.46* 0.33* 0.28* -0.43* -0.18* 1
Leverage -0.23* 0.01 0.35* 0.33* -0.10* -0.11* 0.16* 1
Firm’s Characteristics
Debt Due in ‘08 0.04 -0.00 -0.08 -0.21* 0.08 -0.05 -0.02 -0.09
Summary statistics for the merged Compustat-DealScan sample. Includes all non-FIRE firms with continuous
presence in the dataset from 2003 to 2014 that had positive R&D expenditures in at least one year between 2004
and 2007. Bank variables are averages weighted by bank shares in the firm’s last pre-crisis loan syndicate.
* indicates that pairwise correlation coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the 5% level.
correlation between bank-relationship measures and the share of debt due after 2008. This is
expected if firms do not anticipate the relevance of bank health.
4. Results
This section presents estimation results for the empirical strategy discussed in Section 2.
Section 4.1 presents results of the first stage regressions on the effect of crisis exposure on
productivity-enhancing investments. Section 4.2 presents estimates of the effect of these in-
vestments on ∆Output, while identification assumptions are tested in Section 4.3 and 4.4.
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Table 3: First Stage: Effect of Crisis-Exposure on Firm-Level Investment in Productivity
R&D Investments Intangible Investments
Variable Coeff. Const. Rˆ2 F-val. Coeff. Const. Rˆ2 F-val.
Bank’s Asset Quality
Asset Quality 0.084*** -0.031 0.020 10.5 0.056*** 0.019 0.000 16.1
(0.026) (0.071) (0.014) (0.038)
∆ Asset Quality 0.057** 0.980*** 0.016 3.3 0.026 0.060 0.002 1.3
(0.022) (0.062) (0.023) (0.058)
Bank’s Crisis Exposure
% Lehman Lead -0.049** 0.256*** 0.006 4.5 -0.020 -0.017 0.001 0.66
(0.023) (0.048) (0.021) (0.044)
ABX Exposure -0.026 0.255* 0.001 0.7 -0.013 0.191 0.001 0.2
(0.032) (0.130) (0.013) (0.122)
Deposits/Assets 0.074*** -0.116 0.001 12.1 0.037*** 0.004 0.005 7.7
(0.021) (0.092) (0.013) (0.064)
Bankruptcy Dummy -0.029* 0.152*** 0.002 3.7 -0.029** 0.144*** 0.003 4.4
(0.015) (0.036) (0.014) (0.032)
Bank’s Balance Sheet
BLP/Loans -0.014 0.173*** 0.000 0.2 -0.015 0.168*** 0.000 0.5
(0.028) (0.063) (0.022) (0.044)
Leverage Ratio -0.080** 0.290*** 0.020 5.3 -0.049* 0.225*** 0.009 2.9
(0.035) (0.077) (0.029) (0.063)
Firm’s Characteristics
Share 1 year -0.073*** 0.014 0.016 28.5 -0.064*** 0.163*** 0.016 24.0
(0.014) (0.043) (0.013) (0.037)
Note: Dependent variable is the ratio of real productivity-enhancing investments in 2009-2010 to 2005
-2007. 519 observations. Estimates obtained from univariate OLS. Standard errors clustered by industry and
given in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.
4.1. First Stage Results
4.1.1. Effect of Exposure on Investment in Productivity
To estimate the effect of the 2008-9 financial crisis on productivity-enhancing investments,
univariate regressions along first-stage equation (1) are run using each measure of crisis expo-
sure. Results are presented in Table 3. The left panel presents results using R&D investments
for Invest as the dependent variable, while the right panel uses intangible investments. Stan-
dard errors are clustered by two-digit industry. All measures are standardized to have unit
standard deviations. Results show that higher exposure to the financial crisis results in lower
productivity-enhancing investments. Firms that rely on loans from banks with high-risk asset
portfolios in 2007 or whose asset quality fell strongly during the crisis invested significantly less
in research and development. Similarly, greater exposure to Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy,
low deposits or high leverage ratios is associated with a decline. For intangible investments
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the effect of asset quality, deposits, bankruptcy, and leverage are significant. The size of co-
efficients is economically relevant: a one standard deviation decline in asset quality results in
an 8.4 percentage point decline in R&D. Coefficients for leverage and deposits are of similar
size, while a standard deviation increase in exposure to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers
reduces investments by 5 percentage points. The effect of having a greater share of debt due
after 2008 is also highly significant on both types of investments: a one standard deviation
increase reduces investments in R&D and intangibles by 6.4 and 7.3 percentage points, re-
spectively. Coefficients for exposure to mortgage backed securities and bad loan provisions
run in the expected direction, but are insignificant.
4.1.2. Difference-in-Difference Estimates
I next assess whether results in Table 3 are driven by exogenous exposure to the financial crisis,
and not by inherent differences between firms. To do so, first-stage regressions are estimated
in difference-in-difference form with time-varying coefficients. The estimation equation reads:
Investi,t = α+ µt + γtExposurei + i,t (5)
where Investi,t measures the ratio of productivity-enhancing investments in year t over invest-
ments in 2007. The equation is estimated for all exposure measures that significantly affect
one of the investment variables. Results are graphed in Figure 4. Graphs in the left column
report coefficients for the effect of crisis-exposure on R&D investments, while intangible capi-
tal investments are used in the right column. Coefficients for asset quality, the change in asset
quality and the deposit-to-asset ratio are multiplied by (-1). Standard errors are clustered
by firm while 2007 is used as the base year. Results show that asset quality has a positive
effect on productivity-enhancing investments after 2007. Oppositely, it has has no significant
effect on developments in investments prior to the crisis. Graphs on the effect of Lehman
exposure, deposit-to-asset ratios, bankruptcy, leverage and the share of debt due have similar
profiles. This is in line with the notion that firms are not ex-ante different for varying degrees
of exposure. In years after the 2008-9 financial crisis, the negative effects of Exposure do not
diminish. Consistent with theory, productivity-enhancing investments do not mean-revert to
compensate for low investments during the crisis. Rather, coefficients remain significant and
often exceed 2009-10 values by the end of the sample. The persistent effect could arise endoge-
nously: if firms grow slowly because of inadequate investments in productivity-enhancement,
their ability to increase such investments later on is reduced. First-stage results in Table 3 are
based on investments in 2009 and 2010, which are unlikely to be affected by an endogenous
lack of firm-growth in those years.29
29Evidence on this is provided in Section 4.3.
18
Figure 4. Time-Varying Effects of Exposure on Investments in Productivity
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Note: Figures report point estimates for γ and 90% confidence intervals based on clustered standard errors.
Base year is 2007.
The difference-in-difference results are robust to changes in the estimation. Alternatives
include using the direct counterpart of Invest in Table 3 as the dependent variable: the ratio
of a two-period moving average of investments to average investments in 2005, 2006, and 2007.
This yields very similar results. Alternatively, equation (5) was estimated in levels using the
log of spending as the dependent variable while adding firm fixed effects to control for time-
invariant heterogeneity. This method is less efficient if productivity-enhancing investments
follow a random walk and standard errors are larger. Results are available upon request.
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Figure 5. Instrument Relevance at Alternative Investment Periods
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Note: Solid lines present p-value of joint significance for bank health variables as instruments for R&D (left) and
intangible (right) investment. Dashed lines add the share of a firm’s long term debt due after 2008. The horizontal line
marks the 5% significance level.
4.1.3. Instrument Validity
To use these measures as instruments the relevance condition of a non-zero correlation between
instruments and endogenous regressors must hold. Table 3 shows that this is satisfied for most
instruments, although some are ‘weak’. Weak instruments can result in biased second-stage
estimates as they distort the normality in coefficient and standard error distributions (e.g.
Stock and Yogo 2002). Staiger and Stock (1997) suggest that as a rule of thumb, univariate
F-statistics should at least equal 10. This condition only holds for asset quality and the share
of debt due after 2008. To alleviate weak instrument concerns, I estimate the second stage
using combinations of instruments, which increases overall relevance and significance of the
first stage.30 All instruments that are at least significant in univariate regressions on one
type of investment are used, in two combinations. The first combination uses all significant
measures that rely on bank relationships, while the second adds the share-of debt due after
2008. Because the share of debt due is only available for firms with positive long-term debt,
the second combination has a reduced sample size of 456.
To assess the relevance and validity of the combined instruments, Figure 5 displays how
the p-value of joint significance from an F-test over the instruments develops over time. If
instruments capture the effect of exposure to the financial crisis on investments, they should
be uncorrelated with change in investments prior to the crisis. The horizontal axis displays the
years considered: 2009/2010 refers to the ratio of investments in those years to investments in
three pre-crisis years, 2010/2011 refers to investments one year later, etc. Solid lines refer to
bank-relationship measures of exposure using the full sample, while dashed lines include the
30Second-stage results using asset quality and the share of debt due after 2008 are provided in Appendix A.
These results are in line with the hypothesis. The main results in this paper use the combination of instruments,
as the associated results are more stable. Results with single instruments are more sensitive to changes in the
estimation equation and show larger covariance imbalances, particularly in pre-crisis growth trends.
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Table 4: Covariate Balance Check from Fitted Values
Bank-Relationship Instruments Incl. Share due after 2008
Low Exposure High Exposure Low Exposure High Exposure
Variable N =259 N = 260 N = 226 N = 227
Continuous Vars. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Pre-Crisis Assets (log) 6.40 1.52 7.93 1.80 6.85 1.48 7.89 1.94
Pre-Crisis Sales Gr. 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.12
Crisis Cash Flow Gr. 0.90 0.80 0.90 0.71 1.03 0.74 0.90 0.71
Age (log) 3.34 0.45 3.55 0.53 3.41 0.47 3.53 0.53
Fixed Effects Spearman’s Rank r Product Mom. r Spearman’s Rank r Product Mom. r
Industry Code, 1-digit 0.85 0.95 0.89 0.96
Industry Code, 2-digit 0.65 0.84 0.67 0.87
Headquarter State 0.84 0.85 0.78 0.86
Note: low and high exposure respectively refer to firms with fitted values of R&D and intangible investments above or
below the median, from first stage regressions using bank characteristics, weighted by firm’s last pre-crisis syndicate.
share of debt due after 2008. The figure shows that firm-exposure to the crisis has no significant
effect on investments prior to 2008. After 2008, the instruments are highly significant and
p-values are around 0.01 on most horizons between 2009 and 2012. This implies that the
combined instruments have a prolonged effect on productivity-enhancing investments during
the Great Recession while not affecting investments in earlier years, in line with Figure 4.
An additional test for instrument validity is provided in Table 4. It compares the mean
values of covariates used in the second stage regressions. For both combinations of instru-
ments, it compares firms for whom the fitted values in the first-stage equation were above
(low exposure) and below (high exposure) the median. The left panel obtains fitted values
from bank-relationship instruments while the right panel includes the share of debt due after
2008. It shows that average annual sales growth prior to the crisis and the decline in profits
during the crisis is nearly identical for both groups. Values for fixed effects are also similar:
the number of firms in each industry and state has correlation coefficients of at least 0.84,
while the rank correlation is at least 0.65. Of some concern is the difference in mean age and
pre-crisis asset size across both groups. Firms with higher exposure to the crisis are larger
and slightly older, which means that some differences between both groups exist. Pre-crisis
assets and age are therefore important control variables.
4.2. Second Stage Results
This section estimates the second stage of the empirical strategy. Results based on bank-
relationship instruments are presented in Table 5, while results that also use the share of
debt due after 2008 are presented in Table 6. Both tables have the same structure. The
upper panel reports results using the fitted value of R&D investments for Invest, while the
bottom panel uses intangible investments. The estimations control for average output growth
between 2004 and 2007 to prevent differences in trend-growth from affecting results. Standard
errors are clustered by two-digit industry to correct for arbitrary intra-sectorial correlation and
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Table 5: 2SLS: Effect of Productivity-Enhancing Investment during Crisis on Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Output Growth 2010-2014
Panel A
∆ R&D Investments 0.347*** 0.375*** 0.416*** 0.313*** 0.368*** 0.339***
(0.111) (0.134) (0.114) (0.0889) (0.0939) (0.0969)
First Stage R2 0.06 0.15 0.27 0.17 0.29 0.31
First Stage Partial R2 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
First Stage F-Statistic 8.3 8.5 10.7 14.9 14.0 13.6
F-Stat.’s P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
J-test Overid. P-value 0.69 0.47 0.47 0.90 0.42 0.45
Observations 516 516 515 516 515 515
Panel B
∆ Investment in Intangibles 0.530*** 0.564*** 0.552*** 0.422*** 0.462*** 0.431***
(0.173) (0.192) (0.133) (0.147) (0.113) (0.105)
First Stage R2 0.06 0.13 0.26 0.16 0.27 0.29
First Stage Partial R2 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04
First Stage F-Statistic 5.6 4.9 11.2 14.7 13.2 15.8
F-Stat.’s P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
J-test Overid. P-value 0.51 0.55 0.56 0.87 0.63 0.68
Observations 516 516 515 516 515 515
Control Variables
Lagged Output Growth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes Yes
Firm Characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes
Impact 2008 Recession No No No No No Yes
Note: Dependent variable is ∆Output between 2010 and 2014. Instruments: Lehman lead share, deposits
over assets, (change in) asset quality, leverage. Bank variables are weighted by firm’s last pre-crisis
loan syndicate. Standard errors, clustered by industry, in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10 and 5, and 1% level, respectively. Firm characteristics: log firm age and firm asset size in 2007.
heteroskedasticity. Column 1 presents the baseline estimations without additional controls.
Column 2 adds industry fixed effects, while state fixed effects are added in Column 3. Column 4
and 5 add additional controls for pre-crisis asset size and age. Column 6 contains the preferred
specification, which includes all control variables as well as the change in cash flow over 2008
to correct for differences in the initial impact of the crisis.
Results in both tables firmly corroborate the hypothesis. Coefficients for productivity-
enhancing investments are highly significant in all specifications and are of economically rel-
evant magnitude. According to the preferred specification in Column 6 of Table 5, a one
point decline in the ratio of crisis R&D expenditures to pre-crisis expenditures lowers output
growth between 2010 and 2014 by 0.33 percentage points. Based on first-stage estimates, a
one standard-deviation change in exposure to the financial crisis would therefore implicitly
lead to a decline in medium-term growth by 1.9 to 3 percentage points, depending on the
measure used. Point coefficients are stable across specifications, and differences never exceed
the size of a standard error. This suggests that omitted variable bias is limited. First-stage
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Table 6: 2SLS: Effect of Productivity-Enhancing Investment during Crisis on Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Output Growth 2010-2014
Panel A
∆ R&D Investments 0.345** 0.349** 0.405** 0.296** 0.355*** 0.372***
(0.134) (0.165) (0.165) (0.122) (0.119) (0.119)
First Stage R2 0.07 0.17 0.32 0.21 0.34 0.38
First Stage Partial R2 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
First Stage F-Statistic 9.0 9.0 14.0 10.0 15.9 13.7
F-Stat.’s P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
J-test Overid. P-value 0.51 0.47 0.47 0.65 0.66 0.72
Observations 453 453 452 453 452 452
Panel B
∆ Investment in Intangibles 0.502*** 0.482*** 0.493** 0.371** 0.408*** 0.482***
(0.180) (0.187) (0.196) (0.153) (0.139) (0.160)
First Stage R2 0.06 0.15 0.30 0.20 0.33 0.36
First Stage Partial R2 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05
First Stage F-Statistic 6.6 8.0 13.6 16.1 15.5 12.3
F-Stat.’s P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
J-test Overid. P-value 0.54 0.62 0.56 0.85 0.75 0.80
Observations 453 453 452 453 452 452
Control Variables
Lagged Output Growth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes Yes
Firm Characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes
Impact 2008 Recession No No No No No Yes
Note: Dependent variable is ∆Output between 2010 and 2014. Instruments: Lehman lead share,
deposits over assets, (change in) asset quality, leverage, share of long term debt due after 2008. Bank
variables are weighted by firm’s last pre-crisis loan syndicate. Standard errors, clustered by
industry, in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 and 5, and 1% level,
respectively. Firm characteristics: log firm age and firm asset size in 2007.
F-statistics usually exceed the rule of thumb value of 10, while J-statistics for Hansen’s test
of overidentifying restrictions never reject the instrument exogeneity condition. Regressions
using different years for investment in productivity and medium term output are provided in
Appendix B. Results are robust to both.
I next assess how the effect of productivity-enhancing investments on output develops over
time. Because it takes two to three years for productivity-enhancing investments to affect a
firm’s potential output, the effect of investments on output in 2010 should be smaller than
subsequent years. To test this, the following projection is estimated annually:
Outputt+h,i/Outputt,i = αh + γh ̂Investi+µ′hXi + φk + ψs + ηi (6)
for h = 1, 2, 3, 4 and t = 2009. The equation is estimated using the preferred specification
in column 6 of Tables 5 and 6. Standard errors are clustered by industry. Results are
presented in Table 7. Each column presents results from regressions at a separate point of the
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Table 7: Projection on Effect Producticity-Enhancing Investments During Crisis on Output
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Output 2010 Output 2011 Output 2012 Output 2013 Output 2014
Instruments: Bank Health Variables (N = 513)
∆ R&D Investments 0.101 0.153 0.187 0.387*** 0.461***
(0.0703) (0.115) (0.116) (0.139) (0.146)
R-squared 0.206 0.196 0.186 0.105 0.092
∆ Investment in Intangibles 0.0988 0.190 0.238* 0.352** 0.470***
(0.0824) (0.135) (0.132) (0.143) (0.143)
R-squared 0.223 0.196 0.195 0.173 0.154
Instruments: Bank Health and Share of L.T. Debt Due (N = 450)
∆ R&D Investments -0.0140 0.107* 0.217*** 0.353*** 0.489***
(0.0497) (0.0573) (0.0624) (0.0921) (0.125)
R-squared 0.220 0.242 0.199 0.169 0.120
∆ Investment in Intangibles -0.114 0.0828 0.220* 0.239* 0.372**
(0.0919) (0.0928) (0.117) (0.144) (0.178)
R-squared 0.138 0.251 0.235 0.246 0.238
Note: Standard errors, clustered by industry, in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 and 5,
and 1% level, respectively. Control variables from column 6 of Tables 5 and 6.
Each cell presents results γh in a seperate regression.
projection horizon. The upper panel uses the significant bank health measures as instruments
for investments, while the bottom panel adds the share of long term debt due the year after
Lehman Brothers. In line with expectations, the effect of investments during the crisis on
growth in 2010 is insignificant in all specifications. Coefficients vary between -0.11 and 0.10.
By 2012, a one percentage point decline in investments comes with a 0.2 percentage point
reduction in growth. The size of coefficients increases until the end of the sample in each
specification. The monotonic increase of coefficients is consistent with two expectations. First,
it is in line with estimates in Mansfield et al. (1971) on the time required from expenditures
in R&D to become productive. Second, it is in line with endogenous growth models, in which
a temporary shortfall in productivity-enhancing investments is not undone by an increase in
investments after the crisis.
4.3. Reduced Form Results
A potential objection to results in Section 4.2 is that the exclusion restriction may be violated:
exposure to the financial crises could affect medium-term output through alternative channels
than productivity-enhancing investments. Before addressing the extent to which this is likely
in Section 4.4, this section presents results in reduced form. By estimating the effect of expo-
sure to credit tightening on medium-term output growth, I assess whether there is correlation
between both independent of the channel through which it runs.
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Figure 6. Development in Output at Firms with High and Low Crisis Exposure
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Note: Solid and dashed lines represent developments in seasonally-adjusted output at firms with below and above
median exposure to the crisis, respectively. Left figure obtains fitted values from bank-relationship instruments while
right figure includes the share of debt due after 2008. Dotted lines present trend growth in output between 2002 and
2007. Vertical line marks Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy date.
In simplest form, this is achieved by graphing the development of output amongst firms
with different degrees of exposure to the crisis. Figure 6 plots average real seasonally-adjusted
output by quarter for firms with below-median (solid) and above-median exposure (dashed).
Firms are grouped based on fitted values of Invest. The left figure uses measures on bank
relationships while the right figure includes the share of debt due after 2008. Sales of each
firm are indexed to unity in the first quarter of 2001. Three results stand out. First, firms
have nearly identical trends prior to the crisis. Although the right hand figure shows some
differences in output developments between 2002 and 2006, standardized output by the end
of 2008 is roughly equal. Second, the decline in output during the crisis is similar for the two
groups, both in timing and size. Third, and most importantly: growth after the trough in
2009 is stronger at firms with low exposure to the crisis. The timing of the latter is in line
with projection estimates in Table 7. The similarity of both groups prior to the crisis marks
a further validation of the empirical strategy, while diverging trends after the crisis are firmly
in line with the hypothesis.
A formal estimation of the reduced form is provided in Table 8. It reports results from
equation:
∆Outputi = α+ λ
′Exposurei + µ′Xi + φk + ψs + ηi (7)
where Exposurei is a vector of exposure-measures containing either bank-health variables
or bank-health variables and the share of debt due after 2008, analogous to instruments in
previous sections. Because these measures are correlated, most elements of λ are insignificant.
Results from Wald tests of joint-significance are therefore presented in Table 8. Columns are
ordered identically to previous tables. Jointly, the effect of Exposure on ∆Output is significant
in all previously-used specifications.
26
Table 8: Reduced Form: Effect of Crisis Exposure on Medium Term Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Output Growth 2010-2014
Panel A
Exposure Partial F-Stat. 3.0** 3.4** 4.9*** 4.0*** 7.1*** 6.5***
F-Stat.’s P-value 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.030 0.112 0.193 0.139 0.214 0.214
Observations 516 516 515 516 515 515
Panel B
Exposure Partial F-Stat. 2.1* 3.0** 3.4*** 2.2* 2.4** 2.0*
F-Stat.’s P-value 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.09
R-squared 0.047 0.134 0.230 0.166 0.255 0.259
Observations 453 453 452 453 452 452
Control Variables
Lagged Output Growth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes Yes
Firm Characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes
Impact 2008 Recession No No No No No Yes
Note: Dependent variable is ∆Output between 2010 and 2014. Exposure variables in Panel
A: Lehman lead share, deposits over assets, (change in) asset quality, leverage, share of long
term debt due after 2008. Panel B adds the share of debt due after 2008. Bank variables are
weighted by firm’s last pre-crisis loan syndicate. Standard errors, clustered by industry,
in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 and 5, and 1% level,
respectively. Firm characteristics: log firm age and firm asset size in 2007.
4.4. Falsification Tests
Results in the previous section provide evidence that firms with higher exposure to the finan-
cial crisis reduced productivity-enhancing investments and subsequently had lower medium-
term growth. I next conduct two falsification tests to further establish whether these results
are causal.
4.4.1. Investments in Other Production Factors
The first falsification test assesses whether investments in other type of production factors
can explain medium-term growth. Firms with higher exposure to the crisis might invest less
in physical capital or reduce employment, which could also affect growth after 2010. If this
is the case, the instrument exogeneity condition is violated and results in Section 4.2 have no
causal interpretation. Results remain valid if investments in other forms of intangible capital
like on-the-job training are at play, because my measures are used as proxies for a firm’s total
effort to become more productive. From a theoretical standpoint it is unlikely that declines in
physical capital could explain medium-term growth: if total factor productivity is unaffected
by the crisis, firms have an incentive to increase investments until their marginal product
equals the cost of capital. Similarly, employment should be increased until wages equal the
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Table 9: First Stage: Effect of Crisis-Exposure on Capital Expenditure and Employment
Capital Investments Employment
Variable Coeff. Const. Rˆ2 F-val. Coeff. Const. Rˆ2 F-val.
Bank’s Asset Quality
Asset Quality 0.035 -0.075 0.000 0.8 0.046*** -0.054 0.017 13.5
(0.040) (0.105) (0.013) (0.036)
∆ Asset Quality -0.052 0.154 0.001 2.1 -0.001 0.046 0.000 0.0
(0.036) (0.131) (0.015) (0.059)
Bank’s Crisis Exposure
% Lehman Lead -0.028 0.061 0.001 0.7 -0.014 0.075 0.001 0.8
(0.034) (0.085) (0.016) (0.057)
ABX Exposure -0.063* 0.274* 0.001 3.0 -0.031* 0.180** 0.001 3.9
(0.037) (0.162) (0.016) (0.088)
Deposits/Assets 0.062** -0.219* 0.001 5.6 0.041*** -0.101* 0.013 11.0
(0.026) (0.115) (0.013) (0.058)
Bankruptcy Dummy 0.026 0.152*** 0.001 0.2 -0.015 0.047 0.002 1.2
(0.054) (0.053) (0.014) (0.032)
Bank’s Balance Sheet
BLP/Loans -0.059* 0.133 0.001 0.1 -0.036** 0.127** 0.011 6.7
(0.033) (0.091) (0.014) (0.050)
Leverage Ratio -0.041 0.074 0.000 2.0 -0.010 0.061 0.000 0.5
(0.035) (0.089) (0.015) (0.052)
Firm’s Characteristics
Share 1 year -0.060* 0.004 0.001 4.0 -0.042*** 0.64** 0.016 25.9
(0.030) (0.051) (0.008) (0.031)
Note: Dependent variable is the ratio of real productivity-enhancing investments in 2009-2010 to 2005
-2007. 519 observations. Estimates obtained from univariate OLS. Standard errors clustered by industry and
given in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.
marginal product of labor. Consequently, short-term credit disruptions should have no lasting
effect.
To test whether this is confirmed by the data, estimations from Sections 4.1 and 4.2 are re-
peated using change in investments in physical capital, measured through capital expenditures
(item capex in Compustat), and changes in employment (item emp). Results from first-stage
regressions are presented in Table 9. The left panel uses growth in capital expenditures as
the dependent variable, while the right panel uses growth in employment. Results show that
exposure has the expected effect on capital expenditures. Coefficients are significant for ex-
posure to mortgage backed securities, low deposit ratios, bad loan provisions, and the share
of debt due in one year. Most coefficients are only marginally significant and F-values never
exceed 5.6. This implies that the effect of my measures of exposure is weaker for capital invest-
ments than for investments in productivity-enhancement. Results on employment growth in
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Table 10: 2SLS: Effect of Capital Expenditure and Employment on Output
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Output Growth I I II II III III IV IV
Panel A
∆ Capital Inv. 0.000 -0.112 0.113 -0.075 0.035 -0.024 0.124 0.215
(0.168) (0.148) (0.151) (0.143) (0.125) (0.159) (0.0950) (0.139)
1st St. R2 0.03 0.29 0.05 0.34 0.05 0.30 0.06 0.34
1st St. Part. R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
1st St. F-Stat. 3.2 1.2 4.7 2.1 6.7 4.0 3.8 4.6
F-Stat.’s P-val. 0.02 0.33 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
J-test Overid. P-value 0.37 0.14 0.57 0.39 0.10 0.16 0.20 0.45
Observations 516 515 453 452 516 515 453 452
Panel B
∆ Employment 0.234 0.483 0.170 0.588 0.145 0.620* 0.289 0.980**
(0.242) (0.336) (0.212) (0.366) (0.217) (0.348) (0.207) (0.448)
1st St. R2 0.12 0.35 0.13 0.38 0.13 0.35 0.12 0.37
1st St. Part. R2 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02
1st St. F-Stat. 4.0 4.3 11.4 9.1 3.6 3.8 7.2 8.9
F-Stat.’s P-val. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
J-test Overid. P-value 0.40 0.29 0.58 0.63 0.11 0.49 0.17 0.57
Observations 504 503 442 441 504 503 442 441
Control Variables
Lagged Growth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Fixed Eff. No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
State Fixed Eff. No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm Charact. No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Impact 2008 Rec. No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: Columns I: bank health instruments that are significant for investments in physical capital or employment
(respectively). Columns II: adds share of debt due after 2008. Columns III: banking instruments used in R&D
tables. Columns IV: adds share of debt due after 2008. Dependent variable is ∆Output between 2010
and 2014. Instruments: Lehman lead share, deposits over assets, (change in) asset quality, leverage.
Bank variables are weighted by firm’s last pre-crisis loan syndicate, share of long term debt due after
2008. Standard errors, clustered by industry,in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at
the 10, 5, and% level, respectively. Firm characteristics: log firm age and firm asset size in 2007.
the right panel are stronger. These regressions effectively replicate results in Chodorow-Reich
(2014) on the Compustat sample. F-statistics exceed 10 for the deposits to assets ratio and
asset quality, which are also important determinants of productivity-enhancing investments.
Note that effects of exposure on employment could work through its effect on investments
in productivity-enhancement, as a reduction in spending on (e.g.) R&D comes with lower
personnel requirements.
Results for the second stage are provided in Table 10. The upper and lower panel present
results for capital expenditures and employment, respectively. Because significance of the
exposure variables is different for capital expenditures and employment, the second-stage
regressions are estimated using different combinations of instruments. Columns I uses all
significant bank-relationship instruments for either capital expenditures and employment.
Columns II add the share of debt due after 2008. Columns III and IV use instruments from
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Section 4.2 excluding and including the share of debt due after 2008, to preserve comparability
with previous results. Standard errors are clustered by two-digit industry. The effect of capital
expenditures on medium-term growth is insignificant in all specifications. Coefficients never
exceed 0.22 and are negative in a number of regressions. This implies that, while affected
firms reduce investments in both capital expenditures and productivity-enhancement, only the
latter is significantly correlated with medium-term output growth. That confirms theoretical
predictions and provides some evidence in favor of the instrument exogeneity condition. The
effect of employment-declines in 2009 and 2010 on medium term growth is significant in two
specifications, although F-values however are always below 10.
To address concerns that changes in employment during the crisis are responsible for re-
sults in Section 4.2, the dependent variable in the second stage is divided by employment. The
resulting variable measures output per employee, which should be affected by productivity-
enhancing investments. Results are provided in Appendix Tables A3 and A4, which are
identical to Section 4.2’s tables except for dependent variables. The estimated effect of invest-
ment in productivity are in line with the previously estimated effect on medium-term output
growth. Results in Table A3 are similar in both significance and magnitude, which is expected
if productivity-gains are the source of medium-term output growth. Regressions in Table A4
are significant if state fixed effects are taken into account.
4.4.2. Placebo Regressions
The second falsification test consists of running placebo regressions on growth after the re-
cession of 2002. This is a test of selection rather than the exclusion restriction. If results in
Section 4.2 present the causal effect of exposure to the 2008-9 financial crisis on medium-term
growth, running the same regressions on growth after a different episode should yield insignif-
icant coefficients. Results are presented in Tables 11 and 12, which replicate Tables 5 and 6,
respectively. The dependent variable in both tables is growth in real output between 2002
and 2004. These years are considered because the pre-crisis trend variable used as a covariate
in all prior specifications measures average growth between 2004 and 2007. Specifications are
unchanged in terms of instruments and control variables. Results in both tables suggest that
the empirical strategy is valid. Developments in productivity-enhancing investments during
2009 and 2010 have no significant effect on output growth between 2002 and 2004. In the full
sample of Table 11 coefficients are less than half the size of estimates in Table 5. Coefficients
in some specifications even turn negative when using the share of debt due after 2008 as an
additional instrument in Table 12.
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Table 11: Placebo Effect of R&D Investment during Crisis on Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Output Growth 2002-2004
Panel A
∆ R&D Investments 0.127 0.177 0.201 0.218 0.241 0.210
(0.227) (0.257) (0.225) (0.254) (0.241) (0.214)
First Stage R2 0.06 0.15 0.27 0.17 0.29 0.31
First Stage Partial R2 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05
First Stage F-Statistic 8.3 8.5 10.2 14.7 12.6 12.5
F-Stat.’s P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
J-test Overid. P-value 0.24 0.25 0.31 0.54 0.79 0.79
Observations 516 516 515 516 515 515
Panel B
∆ Investment in Intangibles 0.0747 0.193 0.286 0.134 0.201 0.184
(0.475) (0.547) (0.438) (0.356) (0.351) (0.315)
First Stage R2 0.06 0.13 0.26 0.16 0.27 0.29
First Stage Partial R2 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04
First Stage F-Statistic 5.6 5.1 11.5 4.4 12.4 14.9
F-Stat.’s P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
J-test Overid. P-value 0.31 0.50 0.66 0.29 0.59 0.67
Observations 516 516 515 516 515 515
Control Variables
Lagged Output Growth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes Yes
Firm Characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes
Impact 2008 Recession No No No No No Yes
Note: Dependent variable is ∆Output, 2002-2004. Instruments: Lehman lead share, deposits over
assets, (change in) asset quality, leverage. Bank variables are weighted by firm’s last pre-crisis loan
syndicate. Standard errors, clustered by industry, in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at
the 10 and 5, and 1% level, respectively. Firm characteristics: log firm age and firm asset size in 2007.
5. Aggregation
This section provides a back-of-the-envelope aggregation of the results in Section 4. To do
so, the firm-level effect of exposure to the crisis on investments and subsequent growth is
added up across sampled firms and compared to a counterfactual. This partial-equilibrium
exercise is presented in Section 5.1. The exercise is of partial equilibrium nature because it
is uncertain to what extent the estimated effect of investments captures the impact on firm
i ’s growth alone, or firm i ’s relative growth to others. Throughout Section 5.1 it is assumed
that the firm-level effect of exposure in growth translates one-on-one to aggregate output. A
discussion on the validity of this assumption and the likely size of general equilibrium effects
are provided in Section 5.2.
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Table 12: Placebo Effect of R&D Investment during Crisis on Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Output Growth 2002-2004
Panel A
∆ R&D Investments .049 -0.019 0.101 0.042 0.050 0.108
(0.151) (0.199) (0.200) (0.166) (0.169) (0.173)
First Stage R2 0.07 0.17 0.32 0.21 0.34 0.38
First Stage Partial R2 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
First Stage F-Statistic 9.0 8.8 17.4 9.9 21.6 17.0
F-Stat.’s P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
J-test Overid. P-value 0.16 0.25 0.12 0.32 0.38 0.56
Observations 453 453 452 453 452 452
Panel B
∆ Investment in Intangibles -0.035 -0.121 0.071 -0.053 -0.075 -0.003
(0.213) (0.323) (0.322) (0.176) (0.202) (0.208)
First Stage R2 0.06 0.15 0.30 0.19 0.33 0.36
First Stage Partial R2 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04
First Stage F-Statistic 5.9 7.6 12.2 15.1 19.6 12.7
F-Stat.’s P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
J-test Overid. P-value 0.20 0.30 0.19 0.29 0.43 0.60
Observations 453 453 452 453 452 452
Control Variables
Lagged Output Growth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes Yes
Firm Characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes
Impact 2008 Recession No No No No No Yes
Note: Dependent variable is ∆Output between 2010 and 2014. Instruments: Lehman lead share,
deposits over assets, (change in) asset quality, leverage, share of long term debt due after 2008. Bank
variables are weighted by firm’s last pre-crisis loan syndicate. Standard errors, clustered by
industry, in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 and 5, and 1% level,
respectively. Firm characteristics: log firm age and firm asset size in 2007.
5.1. Partial Equilibrium Effects
The aggregation exercise under partial equilibrium involves three steps. First, I create a
counterfactual scenario of output growth in absence of the crisis amongst sampled firms. To
do so, I assume that average productivity-enhancing investments would grow at the same rate
during the crisis as the last three years prior to the crisis.31 Second, I use annual estimates from
the projection in Table 7 to calculate a firm-specific path of output if investments had grown
at the average pre-crisis rate.32 The aggregate effect of productivity-enhancing investments
is obtained by adding up the predicted path of output across sampled firms.
31Firms at the 90th percentile of investment growth during the crisis have similar growth rates prior to and
during the crisis.
32Annual fitted growth is obtained by inserting the fitted values of productivity-enhancing investments
at the counterfactual 90th percentile with firm-specific covariates and fixed effects: Ôutputi,t+h/Outputi,t =
αh + γĥInvesti
90
+ µ′hXi + φk,h + ψs,h. The equation is estimated along preferred specification 6 in Tables 5
and 6 which includes all covariates and fixed effects at industry and state level.
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Figure 7. Aggregate Effect of Investments in Productivity from Fitted Values
80
00
00
10
00
00
0
12
00
00
0
14
00
00
0
Ag
gr
eg
at
e 
O
ut
pu
t
2000q1 2005q1 2010q1 2015q1
80
00
00
10
00
00
0
12
00
00
0
14
00
00
0
Ag
gr
eg
at
e 
O
ut
pu
t
2000q1 2005q1 2010q1 2015q1
Note: Solid lines present aggregate seasonally adjusted quarterly output in the sample. Long- and short-dashed lines
present predicted path of output for firms at the 90th and 50th percentile, respectively, of fitted investment growth
using estimates from col. 6 in Table 5. Left figure uses R&D investments, right figure uses intangible investments.
Before proceeding to the third step, Figure 7 plots results from step two. It graphs
developments in quarterly real output from the start of the sample up to 2010. Afterwards, it
plots developments in actual (solid) and counterfactual (long-dashed) output. The left figure
plots results based on R&D investments, while the right figure uses investment in intangible
capital. The predicted effects are substantial: if all firms in the economy move from the actual
to the 90th percentile of productivity-enhancing investments, aggregate output of sampled
firms in 2014 would be 40% higher. This number is elevated by the fact that a number
of large firms has faced both strong exposure to the crisis and low growth in recent years,
which exacerbates the difference between actual and counterfactual growth. It is more robust
to compare counterfactual output with the predicted path of output if all firms had allowed
investments to grow at the median rate (short-dashed). This comparison suggests that output
in absence of the crisis would have been 12% higher.33
The third step involves transforming the sample to facilitate an estimate of the aggregate
effect on GDP. This requires two changes. First, output is multiplied by the average percentage
value added in sales for each firm’s 6-digit industry, to account for the use of intermediate
goods in production.34 Total value added amongst firms in the sample is 445 billion in the
33This estimate implies that the gap between an extrapolated trend of growth between 2001 and 2007 would
be 50% lower under the counterfactual of constant investments compared to median investments.
34Sector data is used because value added is not observed directly: Compustat does not contain data on
wage and salary payments for most sampled firms. Data is obtained from the BEA’s benchmark input-output
table for 2007. Firms are matched to industries in IO-tables using the following procedure. First, firms with
NAICS codes that match a 6-dixit industry code are matched straight to codes on the BAE conversion table.
This creates a match for over 90% of firms. Second, firms with only 3,4 or 5 digit codes in Compustat are
matched to all 6-digit sub-codes in the IO-tables. Value added is calculated by taking a simple average over all
codes. Firms without matchable codes are removed. BEA data is successfully matched for 513 firms. Average
value added is 44%, which is expected for a sample with a large share of manufacturing firms (Moro, 2012).
33
Figure 8. Aggregate Effect of Investments in Productivity from Reweighted Sample
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Note: Solid lines present aggregate seasonally adjusted quarterly value added in the re-weighted sample. Long- and
short-dashed lines present predicted path of value added for firms at the 90th and 50th percentile, respectively, of fitted
investment growth using estimates from specification 6 in Table 5. Left figure uses R&D investments, right figure uses
intangible investments.
fourth quarter of 2007, which is equal to 11.9% of real GDP.35 Second, I reweigh firms such
that the distribution of R&D spending amongst firm-size classes in the sample is similar to
the actual distribution in the U.S. in 2007.36
Results from aggregating developments in value added for the reweighted sample are plot-
ted in Figure 8. A comparison of output from fitted values of investments growing at the
pre-crisis trend and at the median suggests that value added amongst R&D performers would
have been 11% higher if no crisis had occurred. This implies a 2.3% increase in GDP, or
16% of the gap between trend and actual GDP displayed in Figure 1. Comparing actual
developments in value added and fitted values if investments had grown at the pre-crisis rates
suggests a 6.4% increase, which translates to over 40% of the gap.
5.2. Limitations
The main concern with a partial equilibrium aggregation follows form the limitation that
regressions capture the effect of crisis-exposure on productivity-enhancing investments at firms
relative to others. This could lead to an overestimation of the general equilibrium effect.
A financial crisis raises the costs of investments at given prices, which reduces demand for
35The estimated output-fall of 12% in the previous section therefore suggests that the within-sample effect
of the financial crisis on medium-term GDP in the U.S. is therefore 1.4%. This means that reduced investments
amongst the 519 firms in my sample are responsible for almost 10% of the gap between trend and actual GDP
displayed in Figure 1.
36This is needed because the merged Compustat-DealScan sample consists of publicly listed and active on
the syndicated loan market, creating an over-representation of large firms. Appendix Table A5 shows that firms
with less than 1000 employees account for only 1.1 percent of sampled R&D spending, while they accounts for
24.1% of spending at aggregate level. Oppositely, firms with more than 10.000 employees account for 87.1%
of spending by sampled firms and only 52.3% of U.S. spending. As sampled firms are responsible for 54% of
aggregate R&D expenditures, developments in value added for the reweighted sample are then divided by 54%
to approximate the out-of-sample effect of investments on GDP.
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inputs like skilled labor and equipment. In a perfect market this reduces their price and partly
offsets the effect of the rate hike. In the empirical sections, the effects of price changes are not
captured because they apply to all firms equally. Consequently, the aggregation in 5.2 could
therefore overstate the general equilibrium effect of credit shocks on productivity enhancing
investments.
From a theoretical standpoint, it seems unlikely that the offsetting effect of price reductions
would be substantial. Atkeson and Burstein (2015) show that the general equilibrium effects
of policies that affect aggregate demand for productivity-enhancing investments are large in
a baseline endogenous growth model. The size of an offsetting general equilibrium effect de-
pends primarily on the elasticity of input prices to the demand for productivity-enhancing
investments. If prices and wages are sticky, the difference between a partial and general equi-
librium exercise is modest because the response R&D costs to a crisis is impeded. U.S. median
wages rose moderately in 2008 and 2009, which suggests that costs of productivity-enhancing
investments did not decline much. The well-documented lack of disinflation in the aftermath
of the crisis (e.g. Gilchrist et al., 2015) lends further support to this notion. In line with
this, the sticky price model in Anzoategui et al. (2016) replicates the slowdown in produc-
tivity around the Great Recession well. Note that the aggregation may also understate the
general equilibrium effect of productivity-enhancing investments, because it does not consider
spillovers. It is likely that companies which use the output of R&D performers as intermedi-
ary inputs are also affected by reduced technological progress. These indirect effects are not
captured in the aggregation, which may result in an underestimation of the aggregate effect.
6. Conclusion
The financial crisis of 2008-9 and the ensuing Great Recession have led to a large decline
in output throughout developed economies. Per capita output in the United States and
Europe has deviated 10 to 20% from its pre-crisis trend. This is in line with the lack of
recovery observed throughout financial crises over the last century. A growing theoretical
literature suggests that crises have such long-term effects through endogenous growth channels.
Crises reduce the ability of firms to finance productivity-enhancing investments, leading to a
temporary slowdown in growth of potential output. This paper has aimed to provide causal
evidence on that mechanism.
I exploit quasi-experimental variation in bank health and firm debt maturity to exoge-
nously infer the extent to which firms were exposed to credit-tightening during the 2008-9
financial crisis. In particular, I assess whether the quality of a bank’s assets, its exposure to
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy and its balance sheet health in 2007 affect investments in R&D
and intangible capital during the crisis at firms that rely on its loans. Results show that the
ratio of productivity-enhancing investments during the crisis to investments prior to the crisis
reduces by 4 to 8 percentage points for each standard deviation increase in bank-exposure to
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the crisis. The main results show that investments have meaningful effects on output: growth
between 2010 and 2014 is 0.4 percentage point lower for each percentage point decline in
productivity-enhancing investments. That relationship is robust to the inclusion of various
control variables as well as state and sector fixed effects. The validity of the empirical results
have been verified in three ways. First, I use reduced form regressions to show that medium-
term output growth is lower at firms with higher exposure to the crisis, irrespective of the
channel through which this occurs. It is therefore likely that a part of the gap between actual
and trend GDP in the U.S. is due to financial factors. Second, I assess whether developments
in other production factors like physical capital and employment can explain medium-term
growth, and find no relation. Third, I use placebo regressions on growth after the 2001 reces-
sion to show that exposure to the 2008-9 financial crisis does not explain growth over other
horizons.
The results in this paper are relevant for policymakers. A partial-equilibrium exercise that
aggregates the estimates suggests that output amongst sampled firms would be 12% higher
by 2015 if no crisis had occurred. Based on an approximation of firm-level value added, this
suggests that GDP would have been 2.3% higher. If trickle-down effects of innovation to firms
lower in the value chain would be taken into account, the estimated effect would likely be
larger. There are therefore substantial gains to public policies that can prevent firms from
reducing productivity-enhancing investments due to financial constraints. Potential policies
could include tax credits for R&D spending or the provision of subsidized loans.
My findings are in line with endogenous growth models in which crises affect the abil-
ity of firms to finance productivity-enhancing investments. The mechanism through which
credit-tightening reduces investments differs across models. In the simplest case, crises re-
duce optimal productivity-enhancing investments because the associated profits decline with
average interest rates. More complex channels might also apply, such as stricter collateral
requirements or preferences for the timing of payoffs. An assessment of which mechanisms
are at play remains an important avenue for future research.
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Appendix A: Additional Tables
Table A1: 2SLS: Effect of R&D Investment during Crisis on Growth
Output Growth 2010-2014 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ R&D Investments 0.240* 0.319* 0.346*** 0.307** 0.358*** 0.331***
(0.128) (0.169) (0.098) (0.144) (0.115) (0.118)
First Stage R2 0.05 0.13 0.26 0.15 0.27 0.29
First Stage Partial R2 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
First Stage F-Statistic 7.6 5.4 6.5 8.5 4.7 5.5
F-Stat.’s P-value 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01
Observations 516 516 515 516 515 515
∆ Investment in Intangibles 0.361** 0.483** 0.457*** 0.483*** 0.463*** 0.424***
(0.174) (0.206) (0.106) (0.159) (0.122) (0.129)
First Stage R2 0.06 0.13 0.25 0.15 0.26 0.28
First Stage Partial R2 0.01 0.01 0.2 0.01 0.02 0.02
First Stage F-Statistic 8.1 4.9 13.8 6.1 10.4 11.4
F-Stat.’s P-value 0. 00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Observations 516 516 515 516 515 515
Control Variables
Lagged Output Growth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes Yes
Firm Characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes
Impact 2008 Recession No No No No No Yes
Note: Dependent variable is ∆Output between 2010 and 2014. Instrument: Asset quality in 2007 and a dummy.
for firms that did not borrow from banks in Y-9C data. Standard errors, clustered by industry, in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. Firm characteristics: log firm
age and firm asset size in 2007.
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Table A2: 2SLS: Effect of R&D Investment during Crisis on Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Output Growth 2010-2014
∆ R&D Investments 0.239 0.160 0.176 0.309* 0.329 0.452**
(0.224) (0.239) (0.329) (0.160) (0.211) (0.218)
First Stage R2 0.04 0.15 0.30 0.19 0.32 0.35
First Stage Partial R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02
First Stage F-Statistic 18.9 10.5 12.9 18.9 20.7 16.0
F-Stat.’s P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 453 453 452 453 452 452
∆ Investment in Intangibles 0.276 0.187 0.179 0.363* 0.357* 0.486**
(0.250) (0.271) (0.320) (0.185) (0.215) (0.222)
First Stage R2 0.05 0.15 0.29 0.12 0.31 0.34
First Stage Partial R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
First Stage F-Statistic 14.7 8.2 7.4 19.9 13.3 9.2
F-Stat.’s P-value 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 453 453 452 453 452 452
Control Variables
Lagged Output Growth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes Yes
Firm Characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes
Impact 2008 Recession No No No No No Yes
Note: Dependent variable is ∆Output between 2010 and 2014. Instrument: Percentage of long term
debt due after 2008. Standard errors, clustered by industry, in parentheses. * and ** denote significance at
the 10 and 5% level, respectively. Firm characteristics: log of age and firm asset size in 2007.
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Table A3: Alternative Dependent Variable: Labor Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Productivity Growth 2002-2004
Panel A
∆ R&D Investments 0.117* 0.172*** 0.177*** 0.290*** 0.285*** 0.260***
(0.0612) (0.0607) (0.0590) (0.0838) (0.0684) (0.0621)
First Stage R2 0.06 0.15 0.27 0.17 0.29 0.31
First Stage Partial R2 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05
First Stage F-Statistic 8.3 8.5 10.2 14.7 12.6 12.5
F-Stat.’s P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
J-test Overid. P-value .15 .12 .16 .29 .43 .34
Observations 506 506 505 506 505 505
Panel B
∆ Investment in Intangibles 0.245 0.438** 0.370*** 0.540*** 0.453*** 0.422***
(0.158) (0.176) (0.113) (0.185) (0.131) (0.114)
First Stage R2 0.06 0.14 0.28 0.17 0.29 0.31
First Stage Partial R2 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
First Stage F-Statistic 5.1 4.4 7.1 3.9 7.6 8.3
F-Stat.’s P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
J-test Overid. P-value .14 .26 .38 .79 .58 .56
Observations 506 506 505 506 505 505
Control Variables
Lagged Output Growth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes Yes
Firm Characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes
Impact 2008 Recession No No No No No Yes
Note: Dependent variable is ∆Output 2002-2004. Instruments: Lehman lead share, deposits over
assets, (change in) asset quality, leverage. Bank variables are weighted by firm’s last pre-crisis loan
syndicate. Standard errors, clustered by industry, in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at
the 10 and 5, and 1% level, respectively. Firm characteristics: log firm age and firm asset size in 2007.
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Table A4: Alternative Dependent Variable: Labor Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Output Growth 2002-2004
Panel A
∆ R&D Investments 0.0537 0.0470 0.130*** 0.111 0.172*** 0.189***
(0.0407) (0.0604) (0.0312) (0.0719) (0.0582) (0.0567)
First Stage R2 0.07 0.17 0.33 0.21 0.35 0.38
First Stage Partial R2 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06
First Stage F-Statistic 8.7 8.7 10.4 11.4 11.3 10.7
F-Stat.’s P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
J-test Overid. P-value .13 .14 .18 .11 .32 .32
Observations 453 453 452 453 452 452
Panel B
∆ Investment in Intangibles 0.117 0.102 0.252*** 0.183* 0.247*** 0.307***
(0.0892) (0.131) (0.0817) (0.102) (0.0952) (0.104)
First Stage R2 0.06 0.16 0.30 0.20 0.33 0.36
First Stage Partial R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.04
First Stage F-Statistic 5.7 5.8 6.6 11.2 6.0 5.2
F-Stat.’s P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
J-test Overid. P-value .07 .10 .28 .10 .44 .48
Observations 453 453 452 453 452 452
Control Variables
Lagged Output Growth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes Yes
Firm Characteristics No No No Yes Yes Yes
Impact 2008 Recession No No No No No Yes
Note: Dependent variable is ∆Output between 2010 and 2014. Instruments: Lehman lead share,
deposits over assets, (change in) asset quality, leverage, share of long term debt due after 2008. Bank
variables are weighted by firm’s last pre-crisis loan syndicate. Standard errors, clustered by
industry, in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 and 5, and 1% level,
respectively. Firm characteristics: log firm age and firm asset size in 2007.
Table A5: Distribution of R&D, U.S. Firms vs Compustat-DealScan Sample
Percent of 2007 Spending
Employees All U.S. Firms (NSF) Compustat-DealScan Sample
5 to 24 4.03 0.00
25 to 49 2.93 0.00
50 to 99 3.74 0.00
100 to 249 5.00 0.19
250 to 499 3.07 0.24
500 to 999 5.30 0.65
1000 to 4999 15.26 3.14
5000 to 9999 8.42 8.69
10000 to 24999 17.06 16.87
25000 or above 35.22 70.21
Source: Author’s calculations using NSF data. Spearman’s rank correlation: 0.93.
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Appendix B. Robustness Checks Second-Stage Estimations
Tables A6 and A7 respectively repeat estimations in Table 5 and 6 using slightly different
specifications for Invest. In main specifications, the ratio of average productivity-enhancing
investments in 2009 and 2010 to 2005, 2006 and 2007 is taken to calculate Invest. In columns
identified with I of Tables A6 and A7, Invest is calculated by taking the ratio of average
investments in 2009 and 2010 to average investments in 2008, 2007 and 2006. In columns II,
the ratio of investments in 2009 to average investments in 2006 and 2007 is used. In columns
III, the ratio of average investments in 2009 and 2010 to average investments in 2004 to 2007
is used. The estimated effect of instrumented investments on medium-term growth in output
is significantly positive in all specifications in both tables. The sample varies slightly across
specifications because some firms have no positive R&D expenditures in the new base years.
The size of the estimates differ because base years have a large influence on average changes
in investments. The interpretation of results is however similar and results in these tables
Table A6: Effect of R&D Investment during Crisis on Growth for Various Invest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Output Growth 2010-2014 I I II II III III
Panel A
∆ R&D Investments 0.491*** 0.484*** 0.466*** 0.451*** 0.281*** 0.287***
(0.155) (0.186) (0.123) (0.150) (0.0955) (0.0909)
First Stage R2 0.04 0.28 0.03 0.23 0.06 0.44
First Stage Partial R2 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
First Stage F-Statistic 7.4 7.6 10.2 6.8 7.4 11.4
F-Stat.’s P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
J-test Overid. P-value 0.78 0.60 0.84 0.57 0.79 0.41
Observations 508 507 508 507 516 515
Panel B
∆ Investment in Intangibles 0.606** 0.503*** 0.696*** 0.643*** 0.476*** 0.362***
(0.249) (0.125) (0.223) (0.219) (0.145) (0.0818)
First Stage R2 0.02 0.25 0.02 0.21 0.05 0.32
First Stage Partial R2 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03
First Stage F-Statistic 3.8 4.7 8.1 3.2 7.9 15.3
F-Stat.’s P-value 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
J-test Overid. P-value 0.54 0.70 0.76 0.89 0.64 0.60
Observations 508 507 508 507 516 515
Control Variables
Lagged Output Growth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm Characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Impact 2008 Recession No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: Dependent variable is ∆Output between 2010 and 2014. Instruments: Lehman lead share, deposits
over assets, (change in) asset quality, leverage. Bank variables are weighted by firm’s last pre-crisis
loan syndicate. Standard errors, clustered by industry, in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10 and 5, and 1% level, respectively. Firm characteristics: log firm age and firm asset size in 2007.
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Table A7: Effect of R&D Investment during Crisis on Growth for Various Invest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Output Growth 2010-2014
Panel A
∆ R&D Investments 0.503*** 0.599*** 0.484*** 0.489*** 0.271** 0.310***
(0.170) (0.215) (0.152) (0.179) (0.113) (0.108)
First Stage R2 0.05 0.34 0.04 0.29 0.06 0.53
First Stage Partial R2 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05
First Stage F-Statistic 8.9 3.4 7.3 6.6 6.4 10.6
F-Stat.’s P-value 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
J-test Overid. P-value 0.55 0.90 0.40 0.90 0.58 0.73
Observations 508 507 508 507 516 515
Panel B
∆ Investment in Intangibles 0.604*** 0.639*** 0.695*** 0.692*** 0.409*** 0.363***
(0.207) (0.187) (0.192) (0.239) (0.154) (0.131)
First Stage R2 0.03 0.31 0.03 0.28 0.0 0.39
First Stage Partial R2 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04
First Stage F-Statistic 4.1 14.7 5.5 7.2 5.9 17.0
F-Stat.’s P-value 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
J-test Overid. P-value 0.67 0.84 0.53 0.79 0.52 0.78
Observations 508 507 508 507 516 515
Control Variables
Lagged Output Growth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm Characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Impact 2008 Recession No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: Dependent variable is ∆Output between 2010 and 2014. Instruments: Lehman lead share, deposits
over assets, (change in) asset quality, leverage. Bank variables are weighted by firm’s last pre-crisis
loan syndicate. Standard errors, clustered by industry, in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10 and 5, and 1% level, respectively. Firm characteristics: log firm age and firm asset size in 2007.
thus suggest that the effect of investments on medium-term output growth is robust to small
changes in the specification of the investment horizon and base year.
To assess the robustness of results to specification of the output horizon, Appendix Tables
A8 and A9 respectively repeat estimations in Table 5 and 6 using different specifications for
Growth. The first two columns use growth in output between 2011 and 2014 for ∆Output.
Columns 3 and 4 use output between 2010 and 2013 while columns 5 and 6 use growth
between 2011 and 2013. Growth is standardized to 4-year growth to preserve comparability
with results in Section 4.2 and across specifications. Results in both tables show that the effect
of growth in productivity-enhancing investments in 2009 and 2010 is significantly positive over
all horizons. Differences across coefficients are generally modest and are at most one standard
error in size. The estimated effects are largest in the first two columns, which is in line with
past evidence that suggests a two to three year lag in the effect of R&D on growth.
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Table A8: Effect of R&D Investment during Crisis on Growth for Various Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Output Growth Horizon: ‘11-‘14 ‘11-‘14 ‘10-‘13 ‘10-‘13 ‘11-‘13 ‘11-‘13
Panel A
∆ R&D Investments 0.424*** 0.323*** 0.347** 0.362*** 0.449*** 0.328***
(0.110) (0.102) (0.136) (0.117) (0.167) (0.119)
First Stage R2 0.06 0.31 0.06 0.31 0.06 0.31
First Stage Partial R2 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05
First Stage F-Statistic 8.1 13.8 8.2 13.7 8.1 13.8
F-Stat.’s P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
J-test Overid. P-value 0.47 0.38 0.61 0.19 0.26 0.20
Observations 508 507 508 507 516 515
Panel B
∆ Investment in Intangibles 0.638*** 0.362*** 0.586*** 0.478*** 0.700*** 0.356***
(0.163) (0.129) (0.222) (0.129) (0.221) (0.117)
First Stage R2 0.06 0.29 0.06 0.29 0.06 0.29
First Stage Partial R2 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04
First Stage F-Statistic 5.5 17.0 5.5 16.6 5.5 17.0
F-Stat.’s P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
J-test Overid. P-value 0.37 0.52 0.50 0.34 0.38 0.32
Observations 508 507 508 507 516 515
Control Variables
Lagged Output Growth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm Characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Impact 2008 Recession No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: Dependent variable is ∆Output between 2010 and 2014. Instruments: Lehman lead share, deposits
over assets, (change in) asset quality, leverage. Bank variables are weighted by firm’s last pre-crisis
loan syndicate. Standard errors, clustered by industry, in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10 and 5, and 1% level, respectively. Firm characteristics: log firm age and firm asset size in 2007.
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Table A9: Effect of R&D Investment during Crisis on Growth for Various Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Output Growth Horizon: ‘11-‘14 ‘11-‘14 ‘10-‘13 ‘10-‘13 ‘11-‘13 ‘11-‘13
Panel A
∆ R&D Investments 0.436*** 0.388*** 0.309** 0.339** 0.448*** 0.372***
(0.105) (0.102) (0.157) (0.138) (0.149) (0.133)
First Stage R2 0.07 0.38 0.07 0.37 0.07 0.38
First Stage Partial R2 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06
First Stage F-Statistic 8.5 13.6 8.5 13.7 8.5 13.6
F-Stat.’s P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
J-test Overid. P-value 0.66 0.26 0.71 0.52 0.71 0.42
Observations 508 507 508 507 516 515
Panel B
∆ Investment in Intangibles 0.604*** 0.418*** 0.518** 0.490** 0.676*** 0.422**
(0.142) (0.150) (0.245) (0.207) (0.247) (0.179)
First Stage R2 0.06 0.36 0.06 0.35 0.06 0.36
First Stage Partial R2 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.05
First Stage F-Statistic 6.5 12.8 6.5 12.3 6.5 12.8
F-Stat.’s P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
J-test Overid. P-value 0.59 0.42 0.62 0.67 0.66 0.64
Observations 508 507 508 507 516 515
Control Variables
Lagged Output Growth Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm Characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Impact 2008 Recession No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: Dependent variable is ∆Output between 2010 and 2014. Instruments: Lehman lead share,
deposits over assets, (change in) asset quality, leverage, share of long term debt due after 2008. Bank
variables are weighted by firm’s last pre-crisis loan syndicate. Standard errors, clustered by
industry, in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 and 5, and 1% level,
respectively. Firm characteristics: log firm age and firm asset size in 2007.
49
